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Abstract: The information systems science needs its own theories. To this end, the method to 
develop a new theory which Ron Weber, Editor-in-Chief of MIS Quarterly, recently presented is 
very welcome. The method with the four steps is not, however, universal, i.e. it cannot be 
applied to every case. We shall show three different exceptions. First, based on the analysis of 
the lawful states of the novel system we shall demonstrate that the innovative system building 
task must be excluded from the application domain of that method. Secondly, by using different 
categories of dynamic systems we show that the method can be applied to the nilpotent systems 
with the rest point, but the method cannot be applied to the self-steering systems. The latter is 
pity, because the self-steering system is the most natural model of the total intellectual process 
of human being, i.e. the consciously controlled human tasks cannot be theorized by using the 
method presented by Ron Weber. Thirdly, because of social construction of reality and the fact 
that constructs are grounded in common understanding rather than physical reality so the 
possibilities for differing interpretations are great. Further, they may become out dated as 
common understanding can change. 
Keywords: Theory, systems development, human being, dynamic systems, method 
 1. Introduction 
“Nothing is as practical as a good theory” is a phrase we sometimes hear. Interaction 
between theory and practice is two-directional. Theoretical constructs guide our acts 
and our practice shapes our theoretical view on the world. We see our world through 
our theoretical lenses. Giddens (1984, p. 326) uses an expression a sensitizing device, 
when he means the role of a theory, model or theoretical framework in observing of a 
part of the world. Orlikowski (2000) developed a new concept a practice lens, which 
posits human as constituting structures in their recurrent use of technology. The practice 
lens she is proposing focuses on emergent technology structures enacted in practice 
rather than embodied structures fixed in technologies. This practice lens further 
recognizes that in both research and practice researchers often conflate two aspects of 
technology: the technology as artifact (the bundle of material and symbol properties 
packaged in some socially recognizable form, e.g. hardware, software, techniques); and 
the use of technology, or what people actually do with the technological artifact in their 
recurrent, situated practices. 
Ron Weber was an invited speaker in the 26th IRIS in Haikko, Finland. He presented the 
ideas which he was included into his own column MIS Quarterly (2003, pp. iii – xii). In 
these editorial comments, Ron Weber addressed the topic of theory building. His 
motivation is fourfold. First, he believes that, as members of a discipline, we still need 
to improve our theory-building skills. In his view, we still rely too much on theories 
borrowed and adapted from other disciplines – perhaps a manifestation of our need to 
build theories in domains where no prior theory exists. Second, much more has been 
written about theory testing than theory building. He hopes these editorial comments 
might help by providing some useful pointers on how to build high-quality theory. 
Third, he wants to reiterate Bob Zmud’s call for more theory-only submissions to the 
MIS Quarterly (June 1998). Via these editorial comments, he hopes to illustrate the 
ways in which such submissions might be crafted and the types of contributions to 
knowledge that theory-only submissions might seek to make. Finally, he wants to 
canvass briefly some controversial issues relating to theory building – for example, 
whether theory building is even a meaningful activity to undertake within our discipline 
and, if so, what forms it should take. His hope is that his comments will motivate more 
discussion and debate on these issues – issues that perhaps some of us would prefer to 
shun because of the challenges they present to our long-held beliefs about theory. 
In their survey article Lee et al. (2003) support the Ron Weber’s arguments by claiming 
that the technology acceptance model (TAM) is almost the only own theory which 
information systems science has. We really need new own theories for phenomena 
under our studies, especially in our core area independent on is it narrower (Benbasat & 
Zmud, 2003) or broader (Alter, 2003).  
I shall in this paper participate in discussion and debate on theory building as Ron 
Weber wishes. To develop a necessary basis for discussion I have in Section 2 repeated 
his mean message, i.e. his four major steps associated with theory-building which I call 
the RW method. My threefold criticism concerns applicability of the RW method. I 
shall show that the RW method cannot be applied to the systems development process 
 (Section 3), to a certain kind of dynamic system (Section 4) and to social sciences 
(Section 5).  
2. Ron Weber’s view on theory building 
In this section we shall present Ron Weber’s (2003) own method for theory building. 
Because the method plays an important role, we described it in detail. A theory is an 
account that is intended to explain or predict some phenomena that we perceive in the 
world. The terms account and phenomena, however, have particular meanings. Weber 
will explain the latter first and then the former. 
To understand the meaning of the term phenomena, Weber first needs to cover some 
basic ontology. For him, the two fundamental (atomic) constructs the researcher needs 
to be able to describe anything shee perceive in the world are things and properties of 
things. The values of the properties of some thing at a point of space-time are its state. 
Changes of state (changes that occur in the values of properties) are events that occur to 
a thing. Perhaps a counterintuitive idea, however, is that the states of and events that 
occur to a thing are also properties of the thing. States and events do not exist in the 
ether. They “belong to” some thing. Thus, they are properties of the thing. 
Phenomena are the states of things or events that occur to things. When the researcher 
builds a theory, therefore, she is seeking to account for the state(s) of some thing (or 
things) or an event(s) that occurs to some thing (or things). … The theory she seeks to 
build in essence is an attempt to articulate a law (or less formally an association or 
statement) that relates the value of two components of the user’s state. … She might 
have articulated the theory at the outset of her research on the basis of prior research 
and her own knowledge and experience. Alternatively, she might have articulated it 
only in light of insights she has obtained after long period of intensive data gathering in 
the field. Whatever the scenario, the phenomenon she is seeking to explain or predict is 
the relationship among values of various components of the state of a particular thing. 
… Weber finally defines that the account of the phenomena is the explanation of the 
laws that are hypothesized to relate them – laws that specify the relationships between 
the values of different properties of a single thing, or laws that specify the relationships 
between the values of properties of different things. Often an account is couched using 
the terms construct and association among constructs. A construct is simply a property 
of a thing (either a simple thing or a composite thing). An association is simply a law 
(formal statement of some kind) that is hypothesized to govern the values of different 
properties (properties of the same thing or different things) or changes to the value of 
properties of a thing. 
Weber (2003) writes that “building good theories is in part an art – an activity that 
requires creative insights on the part of the theory builder. Broadly, however, there are 
procedures we can follow. Below Weber have provided a brief description of four major 
steps associated with theory-building endeavors. For each step, he has also indicated 
how as scholars we might make theoretical contributions to our discipline. Also while 
his comments below imply that scholars follow the steps sequentially, clearly the 
process of building theory is iterative. 
 
 Step 1: Articulate the constructs of a theory 
 
The most fundamental components of a theory are its constructs. Recall, the constructs 
represent properties of things. A theory seeks to explain or predict the values of or 
changes in the values of these properties. Often some subset of these properties is likely 
to have a special status in her theory building. They represent the so-called dependent 
variable (or variables) that the researcher is seeking to explain or predict. They are the 
focal construct (or constructs) in her theory. The other properties are of interest to the 
researcher because she believes they are associated in some way with changes in the 
value of her dependent variable(s). They are the ancillary constructs in her theory. In 
some cases, however, there is no focal construct per se. 
Her choice of the constructs to include in a theory is a critical decision. The focal 
constructs she “sees” in the world and the ways she conceptualizes them are likely to 
have an important impact on the contribution to knowledge she makes via her theory. 
Furthermore, in her choice of ancillary constructs, she has to make important trade-offs 
between richness and parsimony in her theory. 
 
Step 2: Articulate the laws of interaction (relationships) 
among the constructs of a theory 
 
Once she has chosen her constructs, she then needs to explain how they are related to 
one another – in other words, how their values change in concert according to some sort 
of law. 
Her laws of interaction can be specified with varying levels of precision.  
 
Step 3: Articulate the lawful state space of a theory 
 
The lawful state space is the set of combinations of construct values for which the 
theory is expected to hold. It is one element of the boundary conditions of a theory. 
She begins to specify the lawful state space of her theory when she selects the 
constructs to include in her theory. The choice of constructs dictates the things in the 
world to which her theory applies. … Given her choice of constructs, her theory might 
apply only for certain values of each of her constructs. … In principle, she also needs to 
consider all combinations of values of her constructs. 
 
 Step 4: Articulate the lawful event space of a theory 
 
The lawful event space is a set of changes of state of the constructs for which the theory 
is expected to hold. As with the lawful state space, the lawful event space is an 
important element of the boundary conditions of a theory. 
In some cases, an event is unlawful because either the prior state or the subsequent state 
is unlawful. In some circumstances, however, both the prior state and the subsequent 
state are lawful but the transition between them is unlawful. 
3. The systems development process 
In this section we shall analyze the systems development, its lawful states and 
transitions between states. The systems development can be described as follows: 
According to March and Smith (1995) design science products are of four types of 
artifacts: constructs, models, methods, and instantiations. We use their definitions. 
Constructs or concepts form the vocabulary of a domain. A model is a set of 
propositions or statements expressing relationships among constructs. A method is a set 
of steps (an algorithm or guideline) used to perform a task. An instantiation is the 
realization of an artifact in its environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The building process 
 
We would like to enlarge the artifact concept to the innovation concept. Instantiations 
operationalize constructs, models and methods. The motivation behind the building a 
new innovation is either lacking of that innovation or low quality of the outcomes 
achieved by old innovation. It is almost always possible to identify the starting point of 
an effort to construct something new and also the contemporary view on the desired 
state, e.g. the functioning artifact. The purpose of the construction process is to achieve 
a movement from the initial state to the target state (Figure 1). 
In Figure 1 there normally are two states and one process, i.e. a transition from the 
initial state to the target state. According to the RW method, our state space consists of 
two (initial and target) states and our event space of one transition.  
In few cases the initial state can be lacking, i.e. we do not have any earlier innovation, 
in other words the building process of the new innovation will be started from scratch. 
A developer/researcher may have her own ideas about the desired state. But it cannot be 
based on the business need as Hevner et al. (2004) require, because the innovation to be 
 
The initial state The building process The target state 
 built is totally new and anybody does not know whether the new innovation will be a 
success in business sense before it will enter to the market. In this situation we have 
difficulties to apply the RW method. 
In the normal case, some of the interested parties have perhaps considered the initial 
state to be problematic. The performance criteria of the old version of artifact or 
innovation may be below the stated goals. Some party can also have an idea or a 
concept to apply or to use some resources (technological, human, data/ information/ 
knowledge, financial resources) in a new way in order to solve the problem. This 
concept resembles a business concept or business idea. In practice it can be a new 
theoretical or practical, e.g. technical invention. 
March and Smith (1995) connect two models to two states, the first one to the initial 
state and the second one to the target state, in such a way that the models represent 
situations as problem and solution statements. It means how things are at the beginning 
and how they ought to be at the target state (a normative model). The (positive) model 
of the initial state may need to capture the structure of reality in order to be a useful 
representation. The positive model or theory of the initial state of the old information 
system describes both the structure and behavior of the system. The normative model of 
theory of the target state describes which kinds should be both the structure and 
behavior of the new system. To our mind, at least the positive model (but maybe the 
normative one, too) can be built by following the RW method. But we see some 
problems with the development process for the new system. - As we earlier said the 
reason for building the new innovation is “either lacking of that innovation or low 
quality of the outcomes achieved by old innovation”, but Ron Weber does not speak 
anything about, for example,  “quality of outcomes”. Before discussing this important 
theme, we would like to slightly elaborate our simple Figure 1. 
To emphasize the utility aspect motivating construction the (problematic) initial state is 
evaluated by using a certain utility metrics (or many), and the target state is estimated to 
be better, more valuable, more desired with the same metrics. The model of the initial 
and/or target state can (but need not) contain one or more new constructs. 
To think the building task, the target state can be known or unknown. If it is known, the 
task of researchers as builders is to try to implement the desired change from the initial 
state to the target one. If the target state is unknown, we have at least two alternatives. 
We can firstly specify the target state and then try to implement measures to achieve 
that state or we can in parallel realize both target-seeking and implementation. Instead 
of implementing the totally new version of artifact by ourselves, we can also purchase a 
ready-made artifact, if such one exists and is for sale at a competitive price. The good 
hopes of builders will not always materialize, but the final state may differ from the 
target state (Figure 2). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Different alternatives concerning the building process and its outcomes 
 
Our aim is to develop some criteria and measures to estimate the building methods, too. 
We therefore return to the views on methods taken by March and Smith who assume a 
well-structured building task and therefore emphasize the implementation process only. 
We cannot totally agree with them, because at the beginning of the specification and 
parallel processes there does not necessarily be any model representing the solution 
space (i.e. the building task is ill-defined). The task of the specification process is to 
find that model. The other path from the initial state to the final state goes via the 
parallel process, and its idea is to define the solution space model in the course of the 
process from the initial state to the final one. 
Hence, our Figure 2 represents a wider and realistic view on the processes where the 
building methods are needed. We can here conclude that the views of March and Smith 
concerning a method are rather restricted and only applicable to the implementation 
process where the models of the initial state and the target one exist by definition. 
Our ‘theory’ of the systems development in Figure 2 seems to have four states (initial, 
specified, target and final states) in the lawful state space of the theory and four 
transitions (specification, implementation, purchasing and parallel processes) in the 
lawful event space of the theory. At beginning of the building process all the 
stakeholders wish that the final state were the target state, but it does not always take 
place. Is the target state lawful, if the final state after the development effort does not 
coincide with the target one, i.e. there is no transition from other states to the target one? 
We claim that our view in Figure 2 corresponds to reality, i.e. in practice it often takes 
place that the systems development project does not always achieve the target state. The 
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 final information system can be better or worse than planned. Our reasoning above 
shows that we cannot follow the RW method. 
In our description above we use ‘a certain utility metrics’ in evaluating the problematic 
initial state and the desired target and final states. But the RW method does not have 
any such metrics. The reason for that can be the difference between the design science 
and the natural science. March and Smith (1995) and recently Hevner et al. (2004) 
carefully describe that difference. Hence, we propose that some additional boundary 
conditions (cf. Mathiassen, 1981; Mathiassen & Munk-Madsen, 1986) are needed in the 
RW method: The four steps method is not valid for the research problems in the design 
science.  
4. On dynamic systems 
In this section we shall use mathematical notions for very strict description. A reader 
who does not like those notions can read the verbal text and examples only, and she can 
get an overview of our message. Aulin (1989) differentiates three primary types of 
causality: causal relation, causal law and causal recursion, from weakest to strongest 
one. Causal recursion is the type of causality required at the fundamental level of 
physical theory, and thus at that of natural science generally. It implies a complete state-
description of the dynamical system concerned, given by a total state x, as a function of 
which any property x of the system at any moment t can be expressed: z(t)=z(x(t)). 
Causal recursion is defined for the total state x if there is a transitive recursion of x(t) to 
any past state x(τ), i.e. if 
x(t) =φtτ(x(τ)),  φtt'·φt'τ = φtτ  for t > t' > τ 
Thus a system having causal recursion is what Ashby (1972) called "state-determined 
system". 
Causal recursion is nilpotent, if there is such a positive integer s and state x0 that 
φs(x) = x0 V x є X  (  E 
φ(x0) = x0 , 
where E is an Euclidean space and X is a set of states of the system. 
  
 
 
The initial state x0 is called the rest state and the nilpotent dynamical system has the 
property that it comes back to its initial state after the finite number (s) of units of time. 
We can say that an external disturbance (or stimulus) occurring at the moment t=0 
throws the system out of its rest state x0 to a perturbed state x, after which the nilpotent 
causal recursion conducts the total state xt=u along the half-trajectory uT+ until, at the 
moment t=s, the system is back in the rest state x0. During its return journey the system 
gives response to the stimulus. If the same stimulus is offered again, the system gives 
the same finite total response. Thus it is a memoryless system that does not learn from 
experience. 
If the nilpotent system contains feedback, it is called a cybernetic nilpotent system. If a 
computer is programmed to solve a finite problem, i.e. a problem that can be solved in a 
finite number of steps of computation in the machine, it is the cybernetic nilpotent 
system. (But computers can also be programmed to simulate systems that have a full 
causal recursion.) 
 
A dynamical system with a full causal recursion does not have any rest state to be 
reached in a finite number of steps (in a finite time). The causal systems can be 
classified to two categories: nilpotent systems and systems with a full causal recursion. 
 
causal systems 
  | 
  |--- nilpotent systems 
  | 
  |--- systems with a full causal recursion 
 
The mathematical definition of "goal" is based on an infinite process, and thus on a full 
causal recursion (Aulin 1989). To define exactly the difference between a goal and a 
task, Aulin assumes that an external disturbance throws the system at the moment t=0 
from an unperturbed state x to a perturbed state p. Corresponding to the alternative 
 cases, related to the behavior of the Euclidean distance ρ(pt, xR+) of the point pt from 
the half-trajectory xR+ and to the boundedness or unboundedness of xR+ we have the 
following four types of systems with full causal recursion: 
1. If, for a small enough δ-neighbourhood S(x,δ) of x, the Euclidean distance ρ(pt,xR+) 
-> 0 with t -> +∞ for all pє(x,δ), and if the positive half-trajectory xR+ is unbounded, 
the system is called self-steering in state  x. 
2. If the convergence of ρ(pt,xR+) is as above, but the half-trajectory xR+ is bounded, 
the system is called self-regulating in state  x. 
3. If, for a small enough δ-neighbourhood S(x,δ) of x, the Euclidean distance ρ(pt,xR+) 
remains finite for all pє(x,δ), but does not for all pє(x,δ) converge to zero with t -> +∞ , 
the system is called steerable from outside in state  x. 
4. If in any δ-neighbourhood S(x,δ) of x there is a point p for which ρ(pt,xR+) -> ∞ with 
t -> +∞, the system is called disintegrating in state  x. 
 
Here S(x,δ) is the open sphere with centre x and radius δ. The four definitions obviously 
exclude one another, and together exhaust the class of all the dynamical systems having 
a full (i.e. non-nilpotent) causal recursion. 
 
causal systems 
  | 
  |--- nilpotent systems 
  | 
  |--- systems with a full causal recursion 
           | 
           |--- self-steering systems 
           | 
           |--- self-regulating systems 
           | 
           |--- systems steerable from outside 
           | 
           |--- disintegrating systems 
 
We can ask: Can we find any real system in every category, for example, which real 
system belongs to the category of self-steering systems? If the uniqueness of the states 
of mind, along with the goal-oriented nature of thought processes, is typical of human 
consciousness, the only thinkable causal representation of what takes place in human 
mind in an alert state is the self-steering process. It is, however, necessary to limit the 
 interpretation so that what is self-steering in human mind is the total intellectual 
process. All the partial processes needn't be self-steering. 
Real-world examples of self-regulating systems are: a ball in a cup that has the form of 
a half-sphere, a room equipped with a good thermostat (self-regulating equilibrium 
systems); some living organisms like a heart (periodically pulsating self-regulating 
systems); etc. 
A flying ball (the resistance of the air is negligible), a frictionless oscillator and a robot 
are examples of systems steerable from outside.  
A radioactive atom and a dead organism are disintegrating systems. 
I repeat that for the nilpotent systems “an external disturbance throws the system at the 
moment t=0 from an unperturbed state x to a perturbed state p.” By using Ron Weber’s 
terminology this means: A certain event moves the system from state x to state p. If 
state x is the rest state the system always returns from state p to state x via the same path 
and in the finite number of transitions. It seems to me that the RW method is suitable 
for the nilpotent systems.   
But do the other categories of dynamic systems obey the rules of the RW method? We 
above cited Aulin, that the self-steering system is the best model of the total intellectual 
process of human mind. The self-steering system has a special feature: The same state 
never returns, i.e. it always moves to the new state. The number of new states of the 
self-steering system is continuously increasing. Ron Weber in his four steps method 
implicitly assumed that the number of states in a theory is finite, because the lawful 
states and lawful transitions are enumerated beforehand. But the self-steering system 
does not obey those requirements. Hence, the Ron Weber’s theory-building method 
does not contain self-steering systems. If the property of human being, that she never 
returns to the same state, is essential in some human task, the theory containing such 
kind of tasks cannot be built by using the RW method. Hence we can conclude that the 
RW method is not applicable to all kinds of dynamic systems. 
5. On social sciences 
Hevner et al. (2004, p. 76) write: “The behavioral-science paradigm has its roots in 
natural science research methods”. The assertion is not necessarily exact, because Lee 
and Baskerville (2003) show that “… interpretivism acknowledges the existence of a 
phenomenon that is not present in the subject matter studied by the natural sciences. 
People, who are integral to the subject matter that a social scientist observes, develop 
and use their own subjective understandings of themselves, their setting, and their 
history. Therefore, already present in the subject matter of the social sciences are the 
meanings that people create and that they attach to the world around them. In this sense, 
subjective meaning is objective reality: The meanings that human subjects create, 
communicate, and hold are part and parcel of the world that a social scientist receives as 
the subject matter under investigation. The presence of humanly created, and therefore 
sometimes contradictory, meanings and socially constructed realities in the subject 
matter of the social sciences has no counterpart in the subject matter of the natural 
 sciences: ‘The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not ‘mean’ 
anything to molecules, atoms, and electrons’ (Schutz 1962-66, p. 59).” 
 
For theory-creation the phenomena existing in the social world must have shared 
constructs with shared meanings. Those constructs are grounded in common 
understanding rather than physical reality so the possibilities for differing 
interpretations are great. Further, they may become out dated as common understanding 
can change. Hence, we can conclude that the lawful state space of a theory or the lawful 
event space of a theory or both will change as common understanding will change. To 
this end the RW methods is not applicable with social sciences. 
 
Our conclusion will get support from Orlikowski (2000) who differentiates technologies 
and technologies-in-practice. “The latter can be and are changed as actors experience 
changes in awareness, knowledge, power, motivations, time, circumstances, and the 
technology. They are changed through the same process that all social structures are 
changed – through human action. People may change their technologies-in-practice by 
deliberately modifying the properties of their technology and thus how they interact 
with it.” 
6. Discussion 
In Section 3 we achieved the result that the RW method is not valid for the research 
problems in the design science problems. It is mainly based on the differences between 
design and behavioral sciences, which Hevner et al. (2004) describe nicely. The utility 
aspect emphasized in the design science problems may be the central reason.  
In Section 4 we demonstrated that concerning dynamic systems the applicability of the 
RW method varies. The RW method seems to be suitable for the nilpotent systems, but 
it is not applicable to self-steering systems, which in the best way model a human being. 
It is indicative that Hevner et al. (2004) in their article on design science in Information 
Systems research exclude people from IT artifacts. They write “we do not include 
people or elements of organizations in our definition [of the IT artifact] nor do we 
explicitly include the process by which such artifacts evolve over time”. They do not 
give any evidence nor reason for their exclusion, but they may, at least implicitly, guess 
or know that people as a research object much differ from data and material. 
In Section 5 we found that the shared understandings which people have may change in 
the course of time. To this end the lawful state space of a theory or the lawful event 
space of a theory or both must be changed, accordingly.  
In sum, our main result is that the RW method is not universal but only applicable to 
some research problems in information systems research, to such phenomena where the 
objects under study behave regularly. If a researcher wants to apply the RW method in 
her theory building and also wants to include people into her theory of a certain 
phenomenon, she must assume that people behave as machines. Otherwise she must 
select some other approach than the RW method in her theory building. 
 Aulin (1989) applied mathematics to study different dynamic systems. He writes that if 
we cannot directly measure something, we could try to use indirect ways. When we 
cannot directly study free will and human self-steering, we can use, as he demonstrates, 
for example, mathematics to build the model is close enough to human being with free 
will. To slightly generalize the basic notions or constructs Ron Weber (2003) used do 
not have a sufficient expressing power, but Aulin’s constructs seem to give some new 
results. We conclude that the constructs used in the theory building can either inhibit or 
make the theory building possible. 
We have some problems to be studied in the future in our mind. First, the parallel IS 
system building, i.e. to realize both the specification and implementation process 
together by using, for example, prototyping, much resembles the trajectory of human 
being, the tentative candidate of the new system always moves into the new state. This 
process does not seem to follow the RW method, but it should be demonstrated. 
Secondly, the other categories than nilpotent and self-steering ones of dynamic systems, 
although not so important for IS knowledge building, must also be studied. 
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